The constraint isn't the turbine — it's everything around it. Lead times run directionally around three years, with 2029 and 2030 capacity still open; we sold a lot of 2030 slots this quarter because customers, working around EPC schedules, needed the later window. On a three-year build, EPC, permitting, and fuel availability gate the project, not the machine. We're adding capacity anyway: 280 machines installed in ~15 months, ~1,800 U.S. workers added across 2025-2026, targeting 20 GW annualized by mid-2026 and 24 GW in 2028. Based on how we see things today, it's just a start.
I'll tell you, that Smyrna plant changed hands March 31 — AESC sold majority to Fixx Energy, Longroad's subsidiary. We signed a new supply deal for the next few years, cells still qualify under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. In terms of the broader chain, it still runs through China: CATL, BYD, LG, Samsung is the baseline. The domestic-content edge is real but conditional — prohibited-foreign-entity rules not final until December, filing flags it as a risk that can delay contracts. On CATL and BYD going vertical? Hasn't meaningfully changed market intensity.
Look, the forwards don't tell the whole story. Analysts flagged weakness in ERCOT and PJM forward prices even as our demand pipeline looked strong. We've argued the forwards undervalue 2028-2029 and beyond — the ERCOT load "isn't yet on the system, it's getting built." We've stayed well hedged and protected against near-term weakness. That's the merchant model: we carry price exposure but capture premium for clean, firm, reliable power under long-term contracts to our owners. The tunnel's real, but the light's visible.